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ABSTRACT
We examine the impact of bundling strategies on the level of consumer
participation and premium rates realized in an individual health insurance
market characterized by an adverse selection problem. In this context we show
that society may use private insurers to attain universal coverage at equitable
premiums under a pure bundling strategy, where insurers offer only a
comprehensive policy to the market. This result is strengthened as the number of
medical conditions covered in the comprehensive policy increases and as
applicant risk aversion increases. When insurance applicants exhibit low levels
of risk aversion a mixed bundling strategy (or offering single-disease policies
along with the comprehensive policy) improves consumer participation and
decreases premium rates when compared to a pure bundling strategy. In this
case market performance is improved by increasing policy options offered to
applicants. Alternatively, when insurance applicants exhibit moderate levels of
risk aversion a mixed bundling strategy reduces consumer participation and
increases premium rates when compared to a pure bundling strategy. In this case
market performance is improved by reducing policy options offered to
applicants. In addition, when insurance applicants exhibit sufficiently high levels
of risk aversion the consumer participation and premium rates realized under a
pure bundling strategy and mixed bundling strategy converge toward full market
participation. Finally, under all levels of risk aversion we show that offering an
exclusion policy along with the comprehensive policy decreases consumer
participation.
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INTRODUCTION

CONTRIBUTION

As technological advances continue to
improve individuals’ assessments of their
personal health risk factors, privacy legislation
continues to restrict insurers’ use of such
information to design insurance policies.
Advances in biological research and medical
technology, through the advent of genetic
testing, have provided individuals and their
doctors with more accurate assessments of
their genetic predisposition for a large and
growing number of medical conditions (Murry,
Wimbush, and Dalton 2001). Applicants may
use this genetic information to purchase the
most advantageous health insurance policy
available to them in terms of premium rates
and coverage levels. Alternatively, insurance
companies able to access this information may
engage in genetic discrimination, the practice
of denying coverage to, or pricing policies for,
individuals
based
on
their
genetic
predispositions to certain medical conditions
(Gostin 1991). However, industry regulators,
consumer advocates, ethicists, and others argue
that genetic discrimination is unfair to
applicants who have inherited a genetic
predisposition over which they have no
control. Therefore, regulators at both the state
and federal levels have implemented genetic
privacy legislation that prohibits the
discriminatory use of genetic information (e.g.,
genetic test results, family history, and medical
history) by insurance companies (Baderian and
Selzer 2001).

This paper makes a contribution to IS
research in several ways. It contributes to
our understanding of the economic impacts
of the adverse selection problem created by
recent technological and regulatory trends in
the individual health insurance market. It
also contributes to our understanding of the
economics of bundling in this context, which
has not yet been explored in the literature.
Specifically, the model presented in this
paper examines the use of bundling
strategies by a regulated insurance company
to maximize consumer participation in the
individual health insurance market at
affordable premiums.
In this context
marginal costs are high and vary discretely
across insureds based on each insured’s
personal health risk factors. Counter to
typical results in previous work, we show
that, under certain conditions, a pure
bundling strategy may dominate mixed
bundling strategies. That is, providing health
insurance applicants with more insurance
choices and policy options may actually
reduce individual and social welfare. In
addition, this is the first economic analysis to
our knowledge that models an insurance
market using a repeated Cournot game not
only to derive market equilibrium but also to
characterize the market dynamics leading to
equilibrium.

The information asymmetries created
by these technological and regulatory trends
may create an adverse selection problem in the
individual health insurance market in which
fewer individuals are covered by health
insurance. In previous work we have shown
that genetic privacy legislation will force lower
risk individuals, who are no longer able to
signal their low risk status to insurers and
receive preferential policies, to obtain less
coverage than they would in the absence of
regulatory interference, while higher risk
individuals continue to pay premiums that are
not significantly better than they would have
been without regulation. Essentially, no one is
made better off under genetic privacy
legislation, while some individuals are
demonstrably made worse off (Clemons and
2

This research is expected to be
interesting to researchers focusing on the
economic
impacts
of
information
technology, the social costs of information
privacy, bundling economics, and insurance
economics.
It is also expected to be
interesting to managers in, and government
regulators of, the individual health insurance
market as they attempt to balance the genetic
privacy of health insurance applicants with
the availability and affordability of health
coverage.
Thatcher 1997; Thatcher 1998). In order to
sustain the viability of the insurance market
insurers must design a menu of insurance
policy options to mitigate this adverse
selection problem and to restore consumer
participation at affordable premiums.
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In this paper we are principally
concerned with designing bundling strategies
that will reduce adverse selection in the
presence of information asymmetries and
increase
consumer
participation
(the
percentage of conditions covered in the
market) and market participation (the
percentage of outcome risk covered in the
market) in the context of the individual health
insurance market. The goal of maximizing
market participation is critical to public health
officials and market regulators given the
participation externalities caused by failure to
treat communicable diseases, resulting in their
transmission, or incomplete treatment, the
principal driver for the development of drugresistant strains of super-bug (see Clemons and
Thatcher 1997, 2000; and Thatcher 1998 for a
more
detailed
discussion of market
participation as a measure of market
efficiency).
We develop a model that assumes that
applicants for individual health insurance are
at risk for a large number of medical
conditions, predictive genetic tests enable them
to know their genetic predisposition to each
condition, and regulatory policy prohibits
insurance companies from engaging in genetic
discrimination. Insurers may offer a set (or
menu) of insurance policies, provided this
same set is made available to all applicants at
the same price. This menu may include a
comprehensive policy (with full coverage), an
exclusion policy (with a coverage for a single
specified medical condition omitted from the
coverage provided by the comprehensive
policy), and a selection of single disease
policies (with each policy providing coverage
for a single medical condition). Under a
component selling strategy the insurer offers a
selection of single disease policies to the
market; consumers may create their own
customized bundles by purchasing any
combination of policies or purchase nothing at
all. Under a pure bundling strategy the insurer
offers only a comprehensive policy to the
market; consumers may purchase the
comprehensive policy or nothing at all. Under
a mixed bundling strategy the insurer offers a
comprehensive policy and a selection of single
disease policies to the market simultaneously;
consumers may purchase the comprehensive

policy, a customized bundle of single disease
policies, or nothing at all. Finally, under what
we term an exclusion strategy the insurer
offers a comprehensive policy and an
exclusion policy to the market simultaneously;
consumers may purchase one of the policies or
nothing at all. We examine the impact of each
menu design on the purchasing decisions made
by applicants, the premium rates charged by
insurers, and the consumer participation
realized in the market over a range of risk
aversion levels. We model this problem as a
repeated Cournot game and solve it through
iterative numerical computation of the Nash
equilibrium using the best response dynamic.
Since the number of distinct populations is
finite, equilibrium is reached in our repeated
Cournot game in a finite number of moves.
Significantly, although we use numerical
methods, our solution represents an exact
equilibrium and it is not a numerical
approximation.
Critical
findings
are
summarized below:


Insurers may attain universal coverage at
equitable premiums under a pure bundling
strategy. This result is strengthened as the
number of medical conditions covered in
the comprehensive policy increases and as
applicant risk aversion increases.



When insurance applicants exhibit low
levels of risk aversion a mixed bundling
strategy improves consumer participation
and decreases premium rates when
compared to a pure bundling strategy. In
this context market performance is
improved by increasing policy options
offered to applicants.



Alternatively, when insurance applicants
exhibit moderate levels of risk aversion a
mixed bundling strategy reduces consumer
participation and increases premium rates
when compared to a pure bundling
strategy. In this context market
performance is improved by reducing
policy options offered to applicants.



In addition, when insurance applicants
exhibit sufficiently high levels of risk
aversion the consumer participation
realized under a pure bundling strategy
and a mixed bundling strategy converge
toward full market participation and the
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premium for the comprehensive policy
converges to the actuarially fair rate for
the applicant population.


Finally, under all levels of risk aversion an
exclusion strategy decreases consumer
participation when compared to a pure
bundling strategy.

This analysis contributes to our
understanding of the economics of bundling in
a context not explored in previous work.
Previous work has focused on the use of
bundling strategies by multiple-product
monopolists to maximize profits. Much of the
work in the information technology (IT)
literature has focused on the bundling of digital
goods (e.g., on-line music) and assumes that
marginal product costs are low (and the same
for each product) and that consumer valuations
for each product are continuously distributed
across consumers (e.g., uniformally or
normally). Moreover, in the context of music
or other digital goods purchases, risk aversion
is of course not the motivating force driving
the purchase, and the impact of risk aversion
can safely be ignored in these contexts. Recent
work by others in this area demonstrates the
dominance of mixed bundling strategies over
pure bundling and component selling strategies
in maximizing monopoly profits (Chuang and
Sirbu 1999; Hitt and Chen 2000). In contrast,
the model developed in this paper addresses a
different, but complementary, problem context.
Specifically, the differences include the
following:
The model examines the use of
bundling strategies by a regulated insurance
company (restricted to zero profits) to
maximize market participation at affordable
premium rates.


4

In the context of the individual health
insurance market marginal costs of
insurance provision are high and vary
discretely across insureds based on each
insured’s risk portfolio for the covered set
of medical conditions. Since applicants
are generally either at high risk or at low
risk for acquiring a specific medical
condition, risk is discretely (as opposed to
continuously) distributed across the
applicant population. As a result, the
marginal cost to the insurer of providing

insurance coverage to an insured is the
insured’s expected medical costs.


Applicants’ valuations for insurance
coverage also vary discretely across
applicants based on applicants’ risk
portfolios, expected medical costs, and
risk aversion levels.

In this very different context we show
that the effectiveness of alternative bundling
strategies in achieving regulatory goals of
maximizing market participation at affordable
premiums depends critically on the level of
risk aversion exhibited by applicants.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Previous work in insurance economics
has acknowledged that the presence of
information asymmetries may lead to adverse
selection and, in the worst case, complete
market collapse. Much of this work examined
the use of price-quantity contracts (i.e., a form
of rationing in which the contract specifies
both the premium rate applicants must pay and
the deductible for which applicants are
responsible) to mitigate adverse selection in
insurance markets where applicants possess
perfect and private information about their
propensity to incur a single specified loss
(Riley 1979; Miyasaki 1977; Wilson 1977;
Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976). In these models
insurance
companies
typically
induce
individuals to sort themselves into risk classes
by their choice of contracts. High risks select
full insurance coverage at actuarially fair rates
(calculated for the pool of high-risk
individuals) while low risks select partial
insurance coverage but at lower average
premium than that of high risks. The lower
premium for low-risk individuals reflects both
the lower degree of coverage and the lower
average risk of applicants.
Other work addressed the adverse
selection problem through risk classification –
that is, offering different coverage levels and
charging different premium rates to applicants
based on observable characteristics such as
genetic history or based on behaviors such as
smoking (Bond and Crocker 1991; Crocker
and Snow 1986). This work implies that
insurance companies that are able to access
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genetic information (e.g., via genetic testing
and data mining tools) should engage in
genetic discrimination. However, industry
regulators, consumer advocates, ethicists, and
others argue that genetic discrimination is
unfair to applicants who have inherited a
genetic predisposition over which they have no
control.
In order to avoid the perceived
unfairness of risk classification based on
genetic information Tabarrok (1994) proposed
the implementation of genetic insurance. In
this model all individuals purchase genetic
insurance at a single premium and then
undergo genetic screening. Their genetic
insurance policies will pay them the expected
increase in health insurance premiums that
would result from the conditions detected
during their genetic screening. The fully public
results of their testing would then determine
the actual cost of their health insurance in an
efficient market. Unfortunately, genetic
insurance would work only if participation
could be made mandatory and universal;
otherwise, it is prone to the same adverse
selection problem that it is intended to correct
in the health insurance markets. For example,
individuals who do not observe a signal from
their family or medical history regarding the
presence of a genetic predisposition may find
the genetic insurance overpriced and opt out of
the genetic insurance market altogether.
Although the adverse selection problem
presented in this paper is grounded in the
insurance economics literature, we examine the
economic impact of alternative bundling
strategies (as opposed to price-quality
contracts, risk classification, or genetic
insurance) in the context of the individual
health insurance market. Most of the bundling
work in the marketing and IT literatures
examines the use of bundling strategies by
multi-product monopolists to maximize profits,
capture consumer surplus, and reduce
deadweight losses. While early work focused
on 2-good bundling (Adams and Yellen 1996;
Salinger 1995; Schmalensee 1984), more
recent work has examined N-good bundling
settings. For example, Bakos and Brynjolfsson
(1999) examined the impact of bundling a
large number of information (or digital) goods
on the profits earned by a multi-product

monopolist. They demonstrate that when
marginal costs are very low, consumer
valuations for the goods are of comparable
value, and the correlation in demand for
different goods is low, a multi-product
monopolist may use a pure bundling strategy
(i.e., selling the entire bundle of products at a
single price) to increase profits, capture
consumer surplus, and reduce dead weight
losses. Chuang and Sirbu (1999) extended this
work by developing an N-good bundling model
to examine the optimal bundling strategy for
publishers selling and delivering academic
journal articles over the Internet. In this
context they establish mixed bundling (i.e.,
offering both individual articles and journal
subscriptions) as the dominant, profitmaximizing strategy. Hitt and Chen (2000)
also demonstrate the dominance of mixed
bundling strategies in certain monopoly
markets. Assuming that costs of individual
goods or services are strictly greater than zero
(but low) they show that a monopolist will earn
more and consumer satisfaction will increase
by allowing customers to choose a fixed subset
of a larger set of offerings. That is, both
monopolist record clubs and consumers will be
better off if consumers choose their 10 favorite
recordings for a fixed price, rather than being
required to purchase all available selections
under the pure bundling case.
Thatcher (1998) and Thatcher and
Clemons (2000) extended the bundling work to
contexts
outside
of a multi-product
monopolist. They considered a regulated
individual health insurance market and
examined the impact of a pure bundling
strategy, in which the insurer offers only a
comprehensive policy that covers a large
number of medical conditions, on consumer
participation in insurance markets. They found
that if the number of conditions covered in the
comprehensive policy is sufficiently large that
a pure bundling strategy may reduce adverse
selection and increase consumer participation
in the market. This work examined the
sensitivity of this result to a range of model
parameters, including the number of conditions
included in the comprehensive policy, the
distribution of risk across the applicant
population, and the size of the treatment costs.
In this paper we extend this work by
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comparing the effectiveness of alternative
bundling strategies (including a mixed
bundling strategy and a component selling

strategy) on consumer participation and policy
premiums over a range of applicant risk
aversion.

MODEL
Individuals are potential consumers of (or applicants for) private health insurance products
and services. We assume that applicants are at risk for N insurable medical conditions, each of
which has a genetic risk component and a known treatment cost, T . Each individual is endowed
with either a high-risk status with probability  , where 0    1 , or a low-risk status with
probability 1    , for each medical condition through a set of N independent and identical
Bernoulli trials. We assume a sufficiently large applicant population so that we may use the
binomial distribution to approximate the distribution of risk types in the applicant population.
Without loss of generality we normalize the number of potential consumers (or applicants for
individual health insurance) in the market to 1. We define risk type h as those individuals
endowed as high risk for h of the N medical conditions and, therefore, endowed as low risk for
the remaining
type h is

N  h  conditions. The proportion of the applicant population endowed as risk
 h  binom(h, N ,  ) 

where

N!
h 1    N h 
h!N  h!

(1)

binom(h, N ,  ) is the probability density function for the binomial distribution.

We assume that individuals are perfectly informed, through a set of free and perfectly
accurate genetic tests, of their risk type h . The probability that an individual at low risk for a

p L and the
probability that an individual at high risk for a condition will develop that condition is p H ,
where 0  p L  p H  1 . These probabilities are fixed and not altered by individuals’
condition will develop that condition (and incur the associated treatment costs) is

behaviors. Individuals are identical except in their risk type, or the number of conditions for
which they are at high risk. In addition, individuals are risk averse and possess the same
underlying exponential utility function

U  x    e r

(2)

where r is the risk aversion parameter and  is the applicant’s wealth. The exponential utility
function exhibits constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) as defined by Arrow (1971). The
expected utility of risk type h remaining uninsured in any time period t is
h 
N h

h!
( N  h)!
x
h x
y
N h y
EU ht   
p H 1  p H  
p L 1  p L 
U 0  x  y T  (3)
x 0  x!h  x !
y 0 y! N  h  y !


where

0

is the initial wealth of applicants. Equation (3) calculates, for all combinations of x and

y, the probability that risk type h will develop x of his h high risk conditions and y of his (N-h)
low risk conditions, multiplies that probability by the utility associated with incurring the
treatment costs for those (x+y) conditions, and sums the weighted utility calculations over all (x,
y) combinations. This calculation generates the expected utility of risk type h remaining uninsured
in any time period t.
This model considers a single, risk-neutral insurance company participating in a regulated
insurance market in which genetic privacy legislation prevents the insurer from engaging in
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genetic discrimination, or targeting insurance policies to specific applicants based on genetic
information. Therefore, the insurer offers a menu of policy options, specifying coverage levels
and premium rates, from which insurance applicants may choose. We examine four menu designs
(or bundling strategies).


Component Selling Strategy (CSS) – the insurer offers a selection of single disease policies to
the market; consumers may create their own customized bundles by purchasing any
combination of policies or purchase nothing at all.



Pure Bundling Strategy (PBS) – the insurer offers only a comprehensive policy to the market;
consumers may purchase the comprehensive policy or nothing at all.



Mixed Bundling Strategy (MBS) – the insurer offers a comprehensive policy and a selection
of single disease policies to the market simultaneously; consumers may purchase the
comprehensive policy, a customized bundle of single disease policies, or nothing at all.



Exclusion Strategy (ES) – the insurer offers a comprehensive policy and an exclusion policy
to the market simultaneously; consumers may purchase one of the policies or nothing at all.

We examine the impact of each menu design on the purchasing decisions made by
applicants, the premium rates charged by insurers, and the consumer participation realized in the
market. In the initial period the insurer must price the policies based on population statistics.
However, after the initial period the insurer is permitted to engage in actuarially fair re-pricing
based on the applicants’ purchasing decisions and claims experience.
Component Selling Strategy (CSS): Defining the Adverse Selection Problem
Under CSS applicants may create their own customized bundle of insurance coverage by
selecting any number of N single coverage policies, each covering a single condition at a fixed
premium. Since genetic privacy legislation prevents the insurer from engaging in genetic
discrimination, or targeting insurance policies to specific applicants based on genetic information,
in the initial period the insurer must price the policies based on population statistics. Therefore,
the initial premium charged for each of the N single-disease policies at time t  0 is

PS0 

pH  1    pL T

(4)

From the uninformed insurer’s perspective Equation (4) represents the expected claims
experience of each applicant for each of the N medical conditions. For example, assume that 10%
of applicants are at high risk for each medical condition (while 90% are at low risk) and that those
applicants at high risk have a 20% chance of developing the condition while those at low risk
have only a 5% chance of developing the condition. Also assume that an applicant who develops a
medical condition will incur medical costs of 100. In this case, since the insurer does not have
access to individuals’ risk status, the insurer is initially forced to engage in a uniform pricing
strategy. Therefore, from the insurer’s perspective the expected claims experience for each
applicant for each medical condition is 6.5.
Given that risk (and therefore, the realization of risk) is distributed independently and
identically across the applicant population and assuming a sufficiently large applicant pool the
claims experience across single-disease policies will be the same. Therefore, the premiums for
policies covering each condition will have the same distribution and the same expected value.
When applicants enter the market they observe the menu of single-disease policies offered by the
insurance company that period. In the initial period, based on all available information (i.e., the
realization of their risk type,

0

h , and the premiums, PS , charged by the insurer), expected utility

maximizing applicants decide whether to purchase insurance or remain uninsured.
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We assume that individuals possess a positive level of risk aversion r  0 . This
assumption implies that individuals would rather purchase insurance priced at an actuarially fair
rate for that individual than remain uninsured; that is,

piU   T   1  pi U    U   piT , i  [ H , L]

(A1)

In addition, we assume that the level of risk aversion is reasonable. Specifically, we
assume that an individual at low risk for a specific condition would prefer to remain uninsured
than purchase insurance priced at the actuarially fair rate for the entire applicant population; that
is,



U   PS

0

  p U   T   1  p
L

L

U  

(A2)

Together, Assumptions (A1) and (A2) limit the analysis to only ranges of positive risk
aversion in which the adverse selection problem arises.
0

PS , will purchase those policies that cover
conditions for which he is at high risk (given Assumption A(1) ) but will remain uninsured for his
low-risk conditions (given Assumption A(2) ). Specifically, applicants of risk type h will
purchase a customized bundle of h policies, each covering one of the h high-risk conditions,
and will remain uninsured for the  N  h  low-risk conditions. Since applicants only cover their
In the initial period each applicant, given

high-risk conditions and the insurer is permitted to re-price its menu of policies each period based
on claims experience the equilibrium price realized under CSS for each single-disease policy is

PS  p H T

h of purchasing this customized bundle of

The expected utility of applicants of risk type
single-disease policies in equilibrium is

EU S,h 

(5)

N  h !
 y!N  h  y ! p 1  p 

N h
y 0

y

L

N h y

L

U   hPS  yT 

(6)

Consumer participation is measured as the percentage of medical conditions covered by
insurance while market participation is measured as the percentage of outcome risk covered by
insurance. These equilibrium values will serve as a baseline with which to compare the
effectiveness of the pure bundling, mixed bundling, and exclusion strategies in mitigating the
adverse selection problem. Under CSS the equilibrium level of consumer participation is

CP  CSS  

N


h 0

h

h
 
N

(7)

The equilibrium level of market participation is

h
 hpH T
N

h 0
MP CSS  
pH  1    pL NT
N



h

(8)

where the numerator is the claims experience of insureds who purchase single-disease policies (or
the amount of outcome risk covered by insurance) and the denominator is the population’s claims
experience (or the population’s total outcome risk exposure).
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Pure Bundling Strategy (PBS)
Under PBS applicants are offered a comprehensive policy that covers the applicant for all
insurable medical conditions at a single, fixed premium. Each applicant must decide whether to
purchase the policy and become fully insured or remain uninsured. Due to genetic privacy
legislation the initial premium charged for the comprehensive policy at time t  0 is

pH  1    pL NT

PC0 

(9)

After the initial period the insurer will engage in actuarially fair pricing based on claims
experience. Therefore, the premium charged for the comprehensive policy in time t  0 is
N

P 
t
C

c
h 0

 h hpH  N  h  p L T

h ,t 1

N

c
h 0

where

, t  0

(10)

h

h ,t 1

ch,t 1  1 if risk type h purchases the comprehensive policy in time t  1 and

ch,t 1  0 if risk type h remains uninsured. In Equation (10) the numerator is the claims
experience of insureds who purchased the comprehensive policy in the previous time period and
the denominator is the percentage of the population that purchased the comprehensive policy in
the previous period (remember that we normalized the number of applicants to 1).
Based on all available information (the realization of their risk type,

h , and the premium,

t

PC ), applicants decide whether to purchase the comprehensive policy or remain uninsured. The
expected utility of purchasing the comprehensive policy for risk type h in period t is





EU Ct  U  t  PC , t  0
t

Under PBS the level of consumer participation in time

CP t PBS  

N

c
h 0

h ,t

(11)

t is

 h , t  0

(12)

and the level of market participation is
N

MP PBS  
t

c
h 0

 h hpH  N  h  p L T

h,t

p H  1    p L NT

, t  0

(13)

where the numerator is the claims experience of insureds who purchased the comprehensive
policy and the denominator is the population’s claims experience (or the population’s total
outcome risk exposure). Overall, Equation (13) represents the percentage of outcome risk covered
in the market at any time t under a PBS.
Mixed Bundling Strategy (MBS)
Under MBS applicants are offered a choice between a comprehensive policy and a
selection of single disease policies. The mechanisms for pricing these policies and for calculating
expected utilities associated with purchasing policies were presented earlier. Based on all
available information (the realization of their risk type,

t



h , and the premiums, PC and PS ),
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applicants decide whether to purchase the comprehensive policy, a customized bundle of singledisease policies, or remain uninsured. Under MBS the level of consumer participation in time t is


 h 
CP MBS     ch,t h  s h,t h   , t  0
 N 
h 0 
N

t

where

(14)

sh,t  1 if risk type h purchases a customized bundle of single-disease policies covering

high-risk conditions in time
such that

t and sh,t  0 otherwise. Note that applicants cannot over-insure

ch,t  sh,t  1 . Finally, under MBS the level of market participation in time t is
N

MP t MBS  



  s
h 0



h ,t


h
hpH T  c h,t h hpH   N  h  p L T 
N
 , t  0
p H  1    p L NT

h

(15)

where the numerator is sum of the claims experience of insureds who purchased either the singledisease policies or the comprehensive policy and the denominator is the population’s claims
experience (or the population’s total outcome risk exposure).
Exclusion Strategy (ES)
Under ES applicants are offered a choice between a comprehensive policy and an
exclusion policy. For the exclusion policy each applicant may decide which one of the N
conditions to exclude from the policy coverage. Each applicant must decide whether to purchase
the comprehensive policy, the exclusion policy, or remain uninsured. The mechanism for pricing
the comprehensive policy and for calculating the expected utility associated with purchasing the
policy was presented earlier. The initial premium charged for the exclusion policy at time t  0
is

PE0 

p H  1    p L N  1T

(16)

After the initial period the insurer will engage in actuarially fair pricing based on claims
experience. Therefore, the premium charged for the exclusion policy in time t  0 is
N

PEt 

where



 e
h 0




h
 N h
  h  1 p H  N  h p L T  eh, L,t 1 H 
hp H  N  h  1 p L T 
N
 N 

, t  0
N

h
 N  h 

 eh, H ,t 1 h  N   eh, L,t 1 h  N  
 


h 0 

h , H ,t 1 h

eh,H ,t 1  1 if applicants who are risk type h purchase an exclusion policy and decide to

omit a high-risk condition ( eh,H ,t 1
type

(17)

 0 otherwise) and eh,L,t 1  1 if applicants who are risk

h purchase an exclusion policy and decide to omit a low-risk condition ( eh,L,t 1  0

otherwise). Note that applicants may not over-insure such that

eh,H ,t 1  eh,L,t 1  ch,t 1  1 . In

Equation (17) the numerator is the claims experience of insureds who purchased the exclusion
policy in the previous time period and the denominator is the percentage of the population that
purchased the exclusion policy in the previous period.
Based on all available information (the realization of their risk type,
t

t

h , and the premiums,

PC and PE ), applicants decide whether to purchase the comprehensive policy, the exclusion
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policy, or remain uninsured. The expected utility of purchasing the exclusion policy in period
for an applicant of risk type h who is endowed as high risk (H) for the omitted condition is









EU Et ,h, H  p H U  t  Pt E  T  1  p H U  t  Pt E , t  0 .
The expected utility of purchasing the exclusion policy in period
type

h who is endowed as low risk (L) for the omitted condition is







(18)

t for an applicant of risk



EU Et ,h, L  p LU  t  PEt  T  1  p L U  t  PEt , t  0
Under ES the level of consumer participation in time

(19)

t is

N

 N  1
CP t ES     ch,t h  eh, H ,t h  eh, L,t h 
 , t  0
 N 
h 0 

and the level of market participation in time
N

MP ES  
t



 e

(20)

t is


h
 N h
h  1 p H  N  h  p L T  eh, L,t  h 
hp H  N  h  1 p L T  c h,t  h hp H  N  h  p L T 
N
 N 


h, H ,t  h 

h 0

t

p H  1    p L NT

(21)
,

t  0

where the numerator is sum of the claims experience of insureds who purchased either the
comprehensive policy or the exclusion policy and the denominator is the population’s claims
experience (or the population’s total outcome risk exposure).
The Solution Mechanism
This model is a repeated Cournot game.
In the game theory literature models of
repeated Cournot games assume that demand
functions are known to all players, that each
player knows his own cost function, and that
after each period the players are informed
about their own profit and the decisions made
by other players. These assumptions are
consistent with our model. That is, the
distribution of risk across the population is
publicly known to the insurer and applicants
alike (i.e., demand functions are known), each
applicant has perfect knowledge of his own
risk status and insurers observe realized claims
at the end of each period (i.e., each player
knows his own cost function), insurers observe
purchasing decisions made by applicants in
each period, applicants observe re-pricing
decisions made by insurers in each period, and
insurer and applicants alike observe their own
profits in each period.
We solve for the Nash equilibrium of
the game through iterative numerical
computation based on the best response

dynamic. The best response dynamic, which
dates back to duopoly analysis by Cournot,
assumes that players take actions that best
respond to a competing player's last action. In
our model applicants make purchasing
decisions each period that best respond to the
policy prices set by the insurer and the insurer
makes pricing decisions each period that best
respond, given regulatory restrictions, to
applicants’ purchasing decisions made in the
previous period. Through iterative numerical
computation of the best response dynamic, we
derive the Nash Equilibrium from the repeated
game where the insurer will not change its
premiums unless applicants change their
purchasing behavior and where no applicants,
regardless of their risk type, will change their
purchasing decision unless the insurer changes
its prices. We derive the Nash equilibrium in
this way due to the discrete (non-continuous)
distribution of risk across the applicant
population in this problem context. Table 1
provides an overview of the model parameters,
decision variables, and outcome measures
presented in this section.
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Table 1. Model Parameters, Decision Variables, and Outcome Measures

N
T



Number of i.i.d. medical conditions for which applicants are at risk
Treatment cost for each medical condition
Percentage of the population at high risk for each medical condition

h
h

Applicants of type h are at high risk for h of the N medical conditions
Percent of applicants of risk type h in the population

pH
pL
t

Probability an applicant at high risk will acquire a condition

PCt

Premium for the comprehensive policy in period t

PEt

Premium for the exclusion policy in period t

PSt

Premium for each single disease policy in period t

c h ,t

ch,t  1 if type h applicants purchase the comprehensive policy in period t,

Probability an applicant at low risk will acquire a condition
Wealth of each applicant in period t

ch,t  0 otherwise
e h , H ,t

eh, H ,t  1 if type h applicants purchase the exclusion policy and omit a high-risk
condition in period t,

e h , L ,t

eh, L,t  1 if type h applicants purchase the exclusion policy and omit a low-risk
condition in period t,

s h ,t

eh, H ,t  0 otherwise
eh, L,t  0 otherwise

s h,t  1 if type h applicants purchase a customized bundle of single disease
policies to cover their h high-risk conditions in period t,

s h,t  0 otherwise

U x 
r
EU ht

Utility function for applicants – U  x   e
Applicant risk aversion parameter
Expected utility (EU) for type h applicants of remaining uninsured in period t

EU Ct

EU for applicants purchasing the comprehensive policy in period t

EU Et ,h , H

EU for type h applicants at high risk for the exclusion of purchasing the exclusion
policy in period t
EU for type h applicants at low risk for the exclusion of purchasing the exclusion
policy in period t
EU for type h applicants of purchasing single disease policies to cover their highrisk conditions
Consumer participation realized under strategy i  CSS , PBS , MBS , ES in
period t

EU Et ,h , L
EU S ,h
CP t i 
MP t i 

rx



Market participation realized under strategy

t
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i  CSS , PBS , MBS , ES  in period
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OVERVIEW OF RESULTS
Below we briefly overview the findings
derived in the following sections.




(Pure Bundling): We show that insurers
may attain universal coverage at equitable
premiums under PBS. This result is
strengthened as the number of medical
conditions covered in the comprehensive
policy increases and as applicant risk
aversion increases.
(Low Risk Aversion): When insurance
applicants exhibit low levels of risk
aversion MBS improves consumer
participation and decreases premium rates
when compared to PBS. In this context
market performance is improved by
increasing policy options offered to
applicants.



(Moderate Risk Aversion): When
insurance applicants exhibit moderate
levels of risk aversion MBS reduces
consumer participation and increases
premium rates when compared to PBS. In
this context market performance is
improved by reducing policy options
offered to applicants.



(High Risk Aversion): When insurance
applicants exhibit sufficiently high levels
of risk aversion the consumer participation
realized under PBS and MBS converge to
full market participation. In this context
market performance is maximized when a
comprehensive policy is included in the
menu design and is not affected by the
presence of single-disease policies in the
menu.



(Exclusion Strategy): Finally, under all
levels of risk aversion we show that
compared to PBS implementing ES
decreases consumer participation.

With this overview of critical findings
in mind we present the detailed calculations of
consumer choice under the four menu designs
and examine the consumer participation that
results from each as a function of risk aversion.

Table 2 presents the initial model parameters
used to generate the findings presented in the
following sections. Based on these initial
parameters the expected medical cost for an
individual at high risk for a medical condition
is 20 per high-risk condition and the expected
medical cost for an individual at low-risk for a
medical condition is 5 per low-risk condition.
Table 2. Model Parameter Values

T



pH
pL

100
0.10
0.20
0.05

PURE BUNDLING STRATEGY (PBS)
Figures 1a maps equilibrium consumer
participation under PBS as a function of risk
aversion over a range of N . This figure shows
that the level of consumer participation
increases with N . The intuition behind this
result is that as the number of conditions
covered in the comprehensive policy increases,
individuals, who are heterogeneous in their
risk exposure to each individual condition,
become homogenous in their risk exposure to
the entire bundle of conditions. That is, as N
increases, individuals’ expected treatment
costs associated with acquiring the N
conditions converge to a single value, the
average expected treatment costs for the
population (i.e., 6.5 per condition). Therefore,
applicants’ valuations for the comprehensive
policy converge as well. If the number of
conditions covered in the comprehensive
policy is sufficiently large then a PBS
simultaneously eliminates the adverse selection
problem, maximizes consumer participation,
and ensures premium equity across insureds.
These results are accomplished without
adversely affecting the viability of the insurer.
We note that the convergence of applicant risk
over large N occurs despite the discrete
nature of the binomial distribution, which
underlies individuals’ risk exposure in this
problem domain.
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N=300

Consumer Participation (CP)

N=500
100%
N=1,000
80%
N=100

60%
40%

N=25

20%
0%
Risk Aversion (r)

Figure 1a. Consumer Participation Under PBS. This figure compares the level of consumer
participation realized in the individual health insurance market under a pure bundling strategy
(PBS) over different assumptions about the level of consumer risk aversion (r) as the number of
conditions covered in the bundled coverage increases.
Importantly, Figure 1a also shows that
what defines a sufficiently large N depends
on the level of applicant risk aversion.
Specifically,
the
level
of
consumer
participation
under
PBS
increases
monotonically with risk aversion. This finding
is not surprising since applicants with higher
risk aversion are willing to pay a higher risk
premium to avoid uncertain losses associated
with medical conditions for which they are at
risk. In fact, extremely high levels of risk
aversion would result in an applicant buying
coverage to protect against almost all risk and
almost irrespective of cost.
Proposition 1: Under PBS consumer
participation approaches full participation
and the premium rate for the
comprehensive policy approaches the
actuarially fair rate for the applicant
population as the number of medical
conditions covered in the comprehensive
policy increases and as the level of
applicant risk aversion increases.
We note that Proposition 1 holds not
only under the assumption that applicants are
homogeneous in their risk aversion levels (as
assumed thus far) but also under the
assumption that applicants are heterogeneous
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in their risk aversion levels. For example,
Figure 1b compares the level of consumer
participation realized under PBS as the number
of conditions covered in the bundled coverage
increases under three different assumptions of
risk aversion: 1) applicant risk aversion is
homogenous and high, 2) applicant risk
aversion is homogenous and moderate, and 3)
applicant risk aversion is heterogeneous and
uniformally distributed across the applicant
population. Figure 1b illustrates that consumer
participation approaches full participation
under a PBS as the number of medical
conditions covered in the comprehensive
policy increases even in the presence of
heterogeneous applicant risk aversion.

PURE BUNDLING (PBS) VS. MIXED
BUNDLING (MBS) VS. COMPONENT
SELLING STRATEGY (CSS)
Figures 2 – 5 map the equilibrium
consumer participation realized under three
alternative menu designs (PBS, MBS, and CSS)
as a function of risk aversion for
N  25,300,750,1000 assuming the
model parameters values presented in Table 2.
We use these figures to derive a series of
propositions in this section.
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High Risk

Heterogeneous Risk

Aversion (r=.0002)

Aversion

Consumer Participation (CP)

100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

Moderate Aversion
(r=.0006)

0%
Number of Medical Conditions (N)

Figure 1b. Consumer Participation Under PBS (Under Three Different Risk
Aversion Assumptions).

Consumer Participation (CP)

100%
80%

PBS

60%
MBS
40%
20%
0%
Risk Aversion (r)

CSS

Figure 2. PBS, MBS, and CSS ( N  25 ). This figure compares the level of consumer
participation realized in the individual health insurance market under a pure bundling strategy
(PBS) and a mixed bundling strategy (MBS) over different assumptions about the level of
consumer risk aversion (r) when consumers are at risk (and therefore seek coverage for) 25 health
conditions.
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Consumer Participation (CP)

100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
Risk Aversion (r)

Figure 3. PBS, MBS, and CSS ( N  300 ). This figure compares the level of consumer
participation realized in the individual health insurance market under a pure bundling strategy
(PBS), a mixed bundling strategy (MBS), and a component selling strategy (CSS) over different
assumptions about the level of consumer risk aversion (r) when consumers are at risk (and
therefore seek coverage for) 300 health conditions.

Consumer Participation (CP)

100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
Risk Aversion (r)

Figure 4. PBS, MBS, and CSS ( N  750 ). This figure compares the level of consumer
participation realized in the individual health insurance market under a pure bundling strategy
(PBS), a mixed bundling strategy (MBS), and a component selling strategy (CSS) over different
assumptions about the level of consumer risk aversion (r) when consumers are at risk (and
therefore seek coverage for) 750 health conditions.
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Consumer Participation (CP)

100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
Risk Aversion (r)

Figure 5. PBS, MBS, and CSS ( N  1000 ). This figure compares the level of consumer
participation realized in the individual health insurance market under a pure bundling strategy
(PBS), a mixed bundling strategy (MBS), and a component selling strategy (CSS) over different
assumptions about the level of consumer risk aversion (r) when consumers are at risk (and
therefore seek coverage for) 1000 health conditions.
Low Risk Aversion: MP CSS  dominates



PBS 
MPLRA

When insurance applicants exhibit low
risk aversion CSS dominates PBS (see Figures
2 – 5). In this context the level of consumer
participation is improved by increasing
consumer choice. The intuition for this result is
straightforward. As shown earlier, under CSS
applicants will purchase single disease policies
to cover their high-risk conditions given any
risk aversion level satisfying Assumptions
(A1) and (A2), resulting in consumer
participation of 10% and market participation
of 30.77%. However, as shown in Figures 1 –
5, under PBS comprehensive policies attract
only a small number of very high-risk
applicants while the majority of applicants opt
out of coverage when risk aversion is low.
Table 3 shows the market dynamics that
generate one of the equilibrium data points that
make up the PBS step function in Figure 4.
Specifically, it shows the market dynamics that
lead to market equilibrium under PBS when
N  750 and risk aversion is very low –
r  .0002 . In this case equilibrium market

participation is 3.41% and the equilibrium
premium for the comprehensive policy is
5,159.31 (5.8% above the actuarially fair rate –
4,875.00 – for the population). Before
describing the market dynamics leading to this
equilibrium point for N  750 and
r  .0002 on Figure 4 we first define a term
we will use to explain the dynamics. The term
Risk-Equivalent Sub-Pool (Spool) will be used
to refer to a sub-population of applicants that is
homogeneous in personal riskiness (or of the
same risk type h ). In the dynamics presented
in Table 3 there are 756 (or N  1 ) Spools
since an applicant may be at high risk for as
few as zero conditions and as many as 750
conditions.
In period 1 the spools of applicants at
high risk for 73 or more medical conditions
purchase the comprehensive policy while all
other spools opt out of the market and remain
uninsured. The expected medical cost for the
750 conditions for applicants in spool 73 is
4845.00 [EC = 4845]; the initial premium of
the comprehensive policy is 4875.00, which is
0.62% higher than the actuarially fair rate for
the spool. Given their risk status and the slight
but positive level of risk aversion applicants in
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Table 3. Market Dynamics under PBS
t
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

PCt
4875.00
4951.49
5000.36
5033.82
5057.44
5081.92
5094.45
5107.14
5119.98
5132.96
5146.07
5159.31

Who Buys C?
h  73
78
81
83
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
91

% of Population
Buying C
61.39%
37.49%
24.88%
17.99%
12.48%
10.23%
8.29%
6.65%
5.28%
4.15%
3.22%
3.22%

spool 73 and higher will decide to purchase the
comprehensive policy. Alternatively, the
comprehensive policy premium is 0.93%
higher than the actuarially fair rate for spool 72
[EC = 4830]. Given their risk status and low
level of risk aversion applicants in spool 72
and lower will find the comprehensive policy
too expensive and will opt out of the market
and remain uninsured. As shown in Table 3,
this results in market participation of 61.39%
in Period 1.
In period 2 the insurance company will
raise (based on claims experience) the price of
the comprehensive policy from 4875.00 to
4951.49 to account for the lower risk
applicants opting out in Period 1. This price
increase leads spools 74 – 77 [EC = 4860,
4875, 4890, 4905] to opt out of the market and
become uninsured since the new higher price is
too expensive given their risk status and low
risk aversion. The new premium is 0.64%
higher than the actuarially fair rate for spool 78
[EC = 4920]. Given their risk status and slight
risk aversion applicants in spool 78 and higher
continue to purchase the comprehensive policy
despite the increase in the premium. Since
spools 74 – 77 opt out of the market, market
participation falls from 61.39% to 37.49%. In
period 3 the insurance company raises the
price of the comprehensive policy to 5000.36
leading spools 78 – 80 [EC= 4920, 4935,
4950] to opt out of the market, further
reducing market participation from 37.49% to
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N  750, r  .0002
t
PBS  (%) Claims Experience
MPLRA

62.35%
38.45%
25.69%
18.66%
13.00%
10.69%
8.69%
6.99%
5.56%
4.38%
3.41%
3.41%

for C
3039.61
1874.54
1252.21
909.73
633.98
520.94
423.52
340.67
271.11
213.44
166.25
166.25

24.88%. In period 4 the insurance company
raises the premium (based on claims
experience) to 5033.82 leading spools 81 and
82 [EC = 4965, 4980] to opt out of coverage.
As a result, market participation falls to
17.99% in period 4. This dynamic spiral in
which the insurance company increases the
premium and spools drop out of the market
continues as shown in Table 3 until period 12.
At this point a stable equilibrium is achieved
with spools at high risk for 91 or more medical
conditions purchasing the comprehensive
policy at a price of 5159.31 (5.8% above the
actuarially fair rate for the population),
resulting in market participation of 3.41%,
which is approximately one-tenth of the market
participation
realized
under
CSS
–

MP  CSS   30.77% .

The

findings

derived from Figures 2 – 5 and from the
dynamics presented in Table 3 lead to
Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 (Low Risk Aversion):

PBS 
MP  CSS   MPLRA

:

If

insurance applicants exhibit low levels of
risk aversion then CSS dominates (or
generates more market participation than)
the PBS since the market dynamics under
the PBS result in an adverse selection
death spiral for the comprehensive policy,
which essentially destroys the insurance
market.
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Low Risk Aversion: MPLRA MBS 
converges to



r  .0002 . In this case equilibrium market

MP  CSS 

participation is 30.83% (just 0.19% more than
the equilibrium market participation realized

Under MBS the presence of a
comprehensive policy may encourage a small
number of high-risk applicants to purchase the
comprehensive policy instead of a customized
bundle of single-disease policies. As a result,
consumer participation under MBS will be
higher than that realized under CSS, but only
very slightly; in fact, the difference in market
performance between MBS and CSS converges
as risk aversion decreases toward zero and is
not discernable for low levels of risk aversion
in Figures 2 – 5.
Table 4 shows the market dynamics that
generate one of the equilibrium data points that
make up the MBS step function in Figure 4.
Specifically, it shows the market dynamics that
lead to market equilibrium under MBS when
N  750 and risk aversion is very low –

under CSS –

the
equilibrium
premium
for
the
comprehensive policy is 5,310.53 (8.93%
above the actuarially fair rate for the
population and 2.9% above the equilibrium
premium under PBS).
In this case all applicants cover their
high-risk conditions. However, a very small
percent of applicants (those in spools 102 and
higher) also cover their low risk conditions by
purchasing
the
comprehensive
policy.
Therefore, in this case market participation
under MBS is slightly higher than under CSS.
However, as risk aversion tends toward zero
the market performances under MBS and CSS
converge to

PCt

Who Buys C?

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

4875.00
4951.49
5000.36
5045.51
5081.92
5107.14
5132.96
5159.31
5172.65
5186.09
5199.62
5213.25
5226.95
5240.72
5254.56
5268.47
5282.43
5296.45
5310.51

h  73
79
82
85
87
89
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
102

MP  CSS   30.77% . The

market dynamics leading to equilibrium under

Table 4. Market Dynamics under MBS
t

MP  CSS   30.77% ) and

% of Population
Buying C
61.39%
37.49%
21.26%
12.48%
8.29%
5.28%
3.22%
2.48%
1.88%
1.42%
1.05%
0.78%
0.57%
0.41%
0.29%
0.21%
0.14%
0.10%
0.10%

N  750, r  .0002

t
MBS  (%) Claims Experience
MPLRA

72.95%
56.40%
45.24%
39.23%
36.38%
34.33%
32.94%
32.43%
32.03%
31.72%
31.47%
31.29%
31.15%
31.04%
30.96%
30.91%
30.86%
30.83%
30.83%

for C
3039.61
1874.54
1072.83
633.98
423.52
271.11
166.25
128.11
97.66
73.65
54.95
40.57
29.63
21.41
15.31
10.83
7.58
5.25
5.25
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MBS when given N  750 and r  .0002
are presented in Table 4 and summarized
below.
In period 1 the spools of applicants at
high risk for 73 or more medical conditions
purchase the comprehensive policy (as was the
case in period 1 under PBS) while all other
lower-risk spools purchase customized bundles
of single-disease policies to cover their high
risk conditions (instead of remaining
completely uninsured). This results in market
participation of 72.95%. In period 2 applicants
may either buy the comprehensive policy for
4951.49, buy a customized bundle of singledisease policies for 20/condition covered, or
remain completely uninsured. Spools 73 – 77,
which opted out of the comprehensive policy
under PBS, will do the same under MBS but
will cover their high-risk conditions with
single-disease policies. As shown in Table 3,
under PBS, assuming a little risk aversion
spool 78 [EC = 4920] would prefer to purchase
the comprehensive policy for 4951.49 rather
than remain completely uninsured. However,
under MBS applicants in spool 78 would prefer
to opt out of comprehensive coverage and
instead cover their 78 high-risk conditions for
1560.00 (which is the EC associated with those
78 conditions) and remain uninsured for the
remaining 672 low-risk conditions; that is,

EU S ,h 78  EU Ct ,h278  EU ht 78 . In total,
spools 73 – 78 decide to purchase singledisease policies instead of the comprehensive
policy, leading to a reduction in market
participation from 72.95% to 56.40%.
In period 3 the insurance company
raises the premium for the comprehensive
policy to 5000.36 based on claims experience.
In response applicants in spools 79 – 81 decide
to opt out of the comprehensive policy and
instead decide to purchase the customized
bundle of single-disease policies. This dynamic
spiral in which the insurance company
increases the premium of the comprehensive
policy and spools drop out of comprehensive
coverage and into single-disease coverages
continues until period 19, as shown in Table 4.
At this point a stable equilibrium is achieved
with spools at high risk for 102 or more
medical
conditions
purchasing
the
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comprehensive policy at a price of 5310.51
(approximately 8.9% above the actuarially fair
rate for the population and 2.9% above the
equilibrium premium realized under PBS),
resulting
in
market
participation of
approximately 30.83%, which is about 0.19%
higher
that
the
equilibrium
market
participation realized under CSS. The findings
derived from Figures 2 – 5 and from the
market dynamics presented in Table 4 lead to
Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 (Low Risk Aversion):



MBS   MP  CSS   MPLRA
PBS 
MPLRA

If insurance applicants exhibit low levels
of risk aversion then:
(i) MBS dominates CSS in terms of
market participation, but just slightly.
As risk aversion decreases to zero, the
market dynamics under MBS result in
an adverse selection death spiral for
the comprehensive policy; as a result
the market participation under MBS
and CSS converge to

MP  CSS  .

(ii) given Propositions 2 and 3(i), both
MBS and CSS dominate PBS.
Moderate Risk Aversion: MPMRA PBS 


dominates MP CSS 


When insurance applicants exhibit
moderate risk aversion PBS dominates CSS
(see Figures 2 – 5) – that is, unlike the case
under low risk aversion, the level of consumer
participation is improved by decreasing
consumer choice. As shown in Figure 1, as risk
aversion increases a growing number of
applicants prefer comprehensive coverage to
remaining uninsured. As risk aversion becomes
sufficiently high equilibrium consumer
participation realized under PBS will surpass
that realized under CSS.
Moderate Risk Aversion: MPMRA PBS 


dominates MPMRA MBS 


When insurance applicants exhibit
moderate risk aversion PBS dominates MBS
(see Figures 2 – 5) – that is, unlike the case
under low risk aversion, the level of consumer
participation is improved by reducing
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consumer choice. Some applicants with a
lower-risk portfolio of conditions who would
purchase the comprehensive policy under PBS
(instead of remaining uninsured) opt out of
comprehensive coverage under MBS to
purchase a customized bundle of single-disease
policies. This leads not only to a reduction in
consumer participation but also an increase in
the premium paid by applicants that continue
to purchase the comprehensive policy and an
increase in the average premium paid per
covered condition.
Tables 5 (6) show the market dynamics
that generate one of the equilibrium data points
that make up the PBS (MBS) step function in
Figure 4. Specifically, these tables show the
market dynamics that lead to market
equilibrium under PBS and MBS when
N  750 and risk aversion is moderate –
r  .00095. In this case, equilibrium market
participation under PBS (94.18%) is higher
than realized under MBS (89.42%). In
addition, the premium for the comprehensive
policy under PBS (4890.47) is lower than that
realized under MBS (4908.26). Since in this
case market equilibrium is realized very
quickly, we do not provide a detailed
explanation of the market dynamics presented
in Tables 5 and 6.
The findings lead to Proposition 4.

Proposition 4 (Moderate Risk Aversion):



PBS   MPMRA
MBS   MP  CSS 
MPMRA

If insurance applicants exhibit moderate
levels of risk aversion then:
(i) PBS dominates MBS in terms of
market
participation
and
comprehensive policy premium rates.
That is, under MBS some applicants
who would choose to purchase the
comprehensive policy rather than
remain completely uninsured decide
to opt out of comprehensive coverage
to purchase a customized bundle of
single disease policies.
(ii) both PBS and MBS dominate CSS.
That is, given moderate levels of risk
aversion the market dynamics under
PBS and MBS do not degenerate into
a death spiral for the comprehensive
policy as was the case when risk
aversion was assumed to be low.
High Risk Aversion: MPHRA MBS 


converges to MPHRA PBS 


When insurance applicants exhibit
sufficiently high risk aversion the level of
consumer participation under MBS converges
to that under PBS (see Figures 4 and 5). In
fact, when risk aversion is sufficiently high for
a given (sufficiently high) N then market

Table 5. Market Dynamics under PBS
t

PCt

Who Buys C?

1
2
3

4875.00
4887.37
4890.47

h  62
63
63

% of Population
Buying C
95.29%
93.88%
93.88%

Table 6. Market Dynamics under MBS
t

PCt

Who Buys C?

1
2
3

4875.00
4898.26
4908.26

h  65
67
67

% of Population
Buying C
90.14%
84.99%
84.99%

N  750, r  .00095
t
PBS  (%)
MPMRA

95.53%
94.18%
94.18%

Claims Experience
for C
4657.27
4591.39
4591.39

N  750, r  .00095
t
MBS  (%) Claims Experience
MPLRA

93.03%
89.42%
89.42%

for C
4415.23
4171.75
4171.75
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participation under both strategies converges
to full market participation. In this case
consumers
will
prefer
to
purchase
comprehensive coverage to protect themselves
against the potential expense associated with
even those conditions for which they know
themselves to be low risk. That is, adding the
alternative option to purchase single coverage
instead of comprehensive coverage will attract
fewer and fewer applicants as risk aversion
increases (given risk aversion is sufficiently
high). Of course, since market participation
converges to full market participation under
PBS and MBS, both strategies still dominate
CSS. This leads to Proposition 5.
Proposition 5 (High Risk Aversion):



PBS   MPHRA
MBS   MP  CSS 
MPHRA

If insurance applicants exhibit high levels
of risk aversion then:
(i) PBS dominates MBS in terms of
market participation, but just slightly.
As risk aversion increases to very
high levels, the market participation
under PBS and MBS converge toward
full market participation. That is, in
this case the presence of singledisease policies in the menu does not
affect
consumers’
purchasing
decisions.
(ii) Consistent with the case of moderate
levels of risk aversion PBS and MBS
dominate CSS. That is, the market
dynamics do not degenerate into a
death spiral for the comprehensive
policy.
All Risk Aversion Levels: MP PBS 


dominates

MP  ES 

choice between a comprehensive policy and a
customized exclusion policy in which the
applicant may choose the condition to be
omitted from coverage. In this case all
applicants
who
would
purchase
a
comprehensive policy under PBS will, under
ES, choose to purchase the exclusion policy
instead and will choose to exclude a low-risk
condition. This migration of insureds from the
comprehensive policy to the exclusion policy
leads to a decrease in consumer participation.
In this case increasing the policy options
offered to the market (i.e., offering an
exclusion policy in addition to the
comprehensive policy) results in applicants
receiving less coverage.
Proposition

6

(All

Levels

of





Summary of Critical Findings
Table 7 summarizes the critical findings
presented in this section.
We have shown that in markets where
consumers exhibit sufficiently low levels of
risk aversion, maximizing the policy options
available for individual choice improves
market participation. If the insurance company
is forced by regulators to offer only
comprehensive policies, virtually all applicants
will chose to remain uninsured as risk aversion
goes to zero. However, for slightly positive
levels of risk aversion a vanishingly small
group of applicants at greatest overall risk will
choose to purchase a comprehensive policy.

Under ES applicants are faced with a
Table 7. Summary of Findings
Risk Aversion Level
Low Risk Aversion
(r = .0002)
Moderate Risk Aversion (r =
.00095)
High Risk Aversion
(r = .002)
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Risk

Aversion): MP PBS   MP ES  :
The pure bundling strategy dominates the
exclusion strategy in terms of market
participation over all levels of risk
aversion.

Market Efficiency Ordering



MBS   MP  CSS   MPLRA
PBS 
MPLRA


PBS   MPMRA
MBS   MP  CSS 
MPMRA



PBS   MPHRA
MBS   MP  CSS 
MPHRA
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In markets where consumers exhibit
moderate levels of risk aversion, minimizing
the options available for individual choice
improves market participation. That is,
offering comprehensive policies improves
market participation relative to that achieved
by offering a selection of single-disease
coverage policies. In fact, if the insurance
company is forced by regulators to offer a
selection of single-disease policies along with
the comprehensive policy some applicants,
who would purchase comprehensive coverage
rather than remain completely uninsured, will
decide to opt out of the comprehensive policy
in favor of a customized bundle of singledisease policies. This increased set of choices
results in a decrease in consumer participation
and an increase in the premium charged for the
comprehensive policy.
Alternatively, in markets where
consumers exhibit a high degree of risk
aversion, increasing consumer choice by
offering a selection of single-disease policies
along with the comprehensive policy does not
adversely affect market participation. Finally,
we show that offering an exclusion policy
reduces market participation.

CONCLUSIONS
This paper uses a parsimonious model
to examine the theoretical relationships among
alternative bundling strategies, risk aversion,
and market performance in the individual
health insurance market. We note that there are
limitations to the policy-relevance of these
findings to the individual health insurance
market since, as with any theoretical exercise,
many assumptions were made. We have
modeled a market where risk is identically and

independently distributed across the applicant
population, applicants possess private and
perfect information regarding their risk status
for a portfolio of medical conditions,
applicants are identical except in their risk
status, the treatments costs across conditions
and applicants are identical, fixed, and known
to applicants, and the form of applicant utility
function is exponential.
Although our model is simplified, it is
sufficiently robust for our analysis to make a
significant contribution to our understanding of
the economics of bundling in a context not
explored in previous work. Specifically,
previous work has focused on the use of
bundling strategies by multiple-product
monopolists to maximize profits and generally
assumes that marginal product costs are low
and that consumer product valuations are
distributed continuously across consumers.
Alternatively, the model developed in this
paper examined the use of bundling strategies
by a regulated insurance company (restricted
to zero profits) to maximize consumer
participation at affordable premium rates. In
this context marginal product costs are high
and vary discretely across insureds based on
each insureds’ risk portfolio for the covered set
of medical conditions. Applicants’ valuations
for insurance coverage also vary discretely
across applicants based on applicants’ risk
portfolio and risk aversion. In this very
different context we show that the
effectiveness of alternative bundling strategies
in achieving regulatory goals of improving
market participation at affordable premiums
critically depends on the level of risk aversion
exhibited by applicants.
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